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Abstract—This study used a human-in-the-loop simulation to
_ _	
The main advantage of segregated airspace is that it Comment [AB1] : SZ
examine the feasibility of mixed equipage operations in an provides a more homogeneous operating environment (less
automated separation assurance environment under higher variation in aircraft equipage, roles and responsibilities for
traffic densities. The study involved two aircraft equipage human	 operators,	 potential	 differences	 in	 separation
alternatives – with and without data link – and four traffic requirements, etc.). Simpler assumptions about the airspace
conditions. In all traffic conditions the unequipped traffic count
_ 
should result in fewer complications during off-nominal events, Comment [AB2] : SZ add
was	 increased	 linearly	 throughout	 the	 scenario	 from and reduce controller workload and confusion during normal
approximately 5 to 20 aircraft. Condition One consisted solely of operations. Forest and Hansman suggest that, as a side benefitd-	
-
Comment [AB4] : SZthis unequipped traffic, while the remaining three conditions also - - - - - - -	 - - - - - - - - - - - - toefficient segregated airspace could also encourage users toincluded a constant number of equipped aircraft operating invest in advanced equipage (Forest and Hansman, 2006) [1].
within the same airspace: 15 equipped aircraft in condition two,
30 in condition three, and 45 in condition four. If traffic load However, segregated airspace could come at a significant
became excessive during any run, participants were instructed to cost in underutilized airspace capacity and in reduced user
refuse sector entry to inbound unequipped aircraft until sector flexibility, because such partitioning by definition limits access Comment [AB5] : SZload became manageable. Results showed a progressively higher to all users. This could be especially problematic during
number of unequipped aircraft turned away under the second, weather or other flow restricting events. Therefore, research
third, and fourth scenario conditions. Controller workload also into the feasibility of integrated airspace is warranted toincreased progressively. Participants rated the mixed operations determine whether aircraft with different levels of equipage can
concept as acceptable, with some qualifications about procedures
co-exist in the same airspace and under what conditions this
and information displays. These results showed that mixed
may be possible (Kopardekar et al.2008) [2]. Once theoperations might be feasible in the same airspace, if unequipped ,feasibility of an integrated airspace with mixed equipage andaircraft count is held to a workable level This level will decrease{ ________
with increasing complexity. The results imply that integrated its upper/lower bounds of equipage mixrure are esfablished,-"
Comment [AB3]: SZ
airspace configuration is feasible to a limit. The results also future airspace designers can fully weigh the pros and cons of
indicate that the conflict detection and resolution automation,
ed
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f	 h	 will 	 di
segregated vs. integrated airspace.
qu page, an tra rc ensrty are important actors t at
	 nee
to be considered for airspace configuration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the concept for automated separation assurance evolves,
the airspace requirements needed to support it must be
established. One key design question is whether this future
airspace should be segregated or integrated. Segregated (or
‘exclusionary’) airspace would only permit access to those
aircraft that are supported by either ground-based or airborne
separation management automation. Integrated (or ‘non-
exclusionary’) airspace would also permit access to unequipped
aircraft that require controller involvement in the separation
assurance process.
Prior literature on mixed equipage or mixed operations
airspace (involving advanced separation concepts, different
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) mixes, and different
surveillance methods) has not been conclusive (Corker et al.,
2000 [3]; Doble et al., 2005 [4]; Pina and Hansman, 2004 [5];
Forest and Hansman, 2006 [1]; Hoekstra et al., 2000 [6];
Kopardekar et al., 2008 [2]; and Lee et al., 2005 [7]).
Furthermore, the implications of mixed operations on airspace
configuration were not addressed in these studies. The current
study examines the implications of mixed equipage on airspace
configuration requirements for advanced separation assurance
operations, particularly under higher traffic densities.
II. BACKGROUND
Forest and Hansman examined the impact of mixed
equipage on oceanic operations by studying how different
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surveillance rates and separation minima (RNP capabilities of In another study that explored a free-maneuvering aircraft
aircraft on oceanic routes) impacted controllers’ reports of concept, Doble et al. studied mixed operations by examining
scenario difficulty and situation awareness. This study found scripted en route conflicts that involved both Autonomous
the 50% equipage scenario had the most reports of difficulty Flight Rules (AFR) (free maneuvering) and Instrument Flight
and loss of situation awareness (Forest and Hansman, 2006) Rules (IFR) (controller managed) aircraft (Doble et al., 2005)
[1]. Based on these results, the authors recommend further [4]. In contrast to Corker, et al., the controllers were not
exploring airspace segregation as a means of reducing the responsible for the separation of AFR aircraft. In addition, the
complexity	 equipageP	 tY of the mix denvironment. This was also re responsible for maneuvering 	 oundAFR aircraft were	 sP 
_	
g	 -_
aircraft	 in	 mixed	 equipage	 conflicts. 	 Under	 thes
IFR _ Comment [1,B63 : How? Because higher
viewed as a means for providing an equipage incentive to e equipage airspace would be given higher
airlines. In a follow-up study, Pina and Hansman found it was circumstances, the study found that controller performance was priority
more difficult for controllers to correctly detect conflicts when not significantly affected by high numbers of AFR aircraft.
equipage was lower than 50%, and that controllers incorrectly Taking a closer examination of the ground-side data, Lee et al.
identified conflicts between equipages of 20% through 60% showed that the number of autonomous aircraft appeared to
(Pina and Hansman, 2004) [5]. The study was very low fidelity, have little to no impact on controller workload, even when Comment [AB83 : SZ deletion
and examined only 10 aircraft in the simulation scenarios. peak autonomous aircraft sector count more than tripled (from,
The impact of mixed equipage on automated conflict e.g., 	 to 28 (Lee et al, 2005	 7 . Thes	 results indicate stron 	 _g°	 )	 ) [ ]	 eL - - - - - - -	 - Bpotential 	 for	 mixed	 operations	 to	 increase	 capacity. 	 In
_	 Comment [AB93 : SZ change
detection and resolution was 	 examined from the pilot’s
summary, prior research involving mixed equipage operationsperspective in	 free-flight	 studies	 conducted by National indicated overall feasibility. Furthermore, free maneuveringAerospace Laboratory of Netherlands (NLR). Hoekstra et al.
concept
conducted studies utilizing predictive Airborne Separation  simulations involving mixed equipage operations (iareaircraft that are capable of self-separating and aircraft that areAssurance (ASAS) (Hoekstra et al., 2000) [6]. Three concepts
controller-managed) indicated a very high potential to increasefor airspace management were tested, one of which was fully
mixed his ition i i ircraft capacity.
In spite of the potential benefits of integrated airspace, the
Joint Planning Development Office’s (JPDO) Concept of
Operations suggests segregated airspace for trajectory-based
operations. Given the prior research, however, it is unclear if
such segregation is warranted and, if so, at what level of mixed
equipage it would be necessary. None of the prior studies
specifically examined the implications of mixed equipage on
r
_
	
airspace configuration or identified limits of feasibility fo
	 Comment [1B103 : SZ change
mixed equipage operations.
!fig	 g	 P	 Therefore, the current study was conducted to examine if
current day.	
mixed equipage operations are feasible in the same airspace
The NLR studies found the fully mixed condition most 	 under varying levels of traffic densities and varying equipage
acceptable to the pilot subjects, with traffic density and 	 levels. With conflict detection and resolution automation for
equipage having little effect on acceptability. The fully mixed 	 equipped aircraft and conflict detection automation and
procedure also resulted in fewer conflict resolutions; this was 	 resolution advisories for unequipped aircraft, it is hypothesized
attributed to the fact that unequipped aircraft were managed 	 that mixed equipage operations could be feasible at high
with a larger look-ahead time for conflict probing than the
	 overall traffic density with a significant number of unequipped
equipped aircraft. In all, the study found that the fully mixed 	 aircraft. The following sections describe the experimental
concept ast	 referred over the airspace segregation concepts. . _ - method, results, and conclusions of the mixed equipage stud . 	
- Comment [AB73 : SZ –this contradictsP	 P	 !fig	 nc eP	
---d' -------------------- 	 -- - Y^	 ^-
Corker, et al. conducted a study that included two mixed
	
findings of Forest and Hansman
operations conditions that varied the percentage of free 	 III. METHOD	 Comment [AB113 : SZ: paper outline
maneuvering aircraft (Corker et al., 2000 [3]). Controllers
maintained separation responsibility in all conditions, with the
expectation that they would cancel free maneuvering if
separation assurance became a concern. Scenarios
progressively increased traffic count within each run, and
measures of air-ground communications and self-reported
controller workload were obtained throughout each run.
Contrary to initial predictions, controller workload was highest
in the condition with the greatest number of free maneuvering
aircraft. The authors surmised that the operational concept led
to these results, with controllers held responsible for separation
of free-maneuvering aircraft. In the 80% free maneuvering
condition, controllers were overwhelmed by trying to infer the
intent of the free maneuvering aircraft, resulting in high overall
workload.
. In t
 
cond , equ pped and unequ pped a
occupied the same airspace, with unequipped aircraft
monitored by the ground. The same conflict detection and
resolution (CD&R) algorithms were applied for the equipped
and unequipped aircraft. Equipped aircraft did not have to
maneuver around unequipped aircraft; a longer lead-time for
CD&R was used for unequipped aircraft so they would avoid
the ASAS (equipped) aircraft. Two different levels of equipage
(25% and 75%) were examined, and the study examined high
traffic density. The other two concepts that were tested had
some form of se
	
ation usin an airs ace structure similar to
A. Experimental Design
The main objective of this study was to explore the
feasibility and impact of mixed operations between equipped
aircraft managed by automation and unequipped aircraft
managed by air traffic controllers.
All aircraft were Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) and flight management system (FMS)
equipped, and had a required navigation performance of RNP-
1. Presence or absence of an FMS-integrated data link
capability was the single equipage factor distinguishing
equipped and unequipped aircraft. This integrated data link
capability (similar to that supported by the Future Air
Navigation System (FANS-1A) avionics package) enabled
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Figure 1. Experiment Design
Comment [AB12I : SZ correction
transmission of FMS-loadable trajectory clearances directly
from the ground. On the groundside, integration of data link
with an automated CD&R capability enabled ground
automation to detect conflicts, construct trajectories to resolve
those conflicts, and send them directly as clearances to the
flight deck, all without involving the air traffic controller.
Flight crews could load and review the uplinked trajectory, and
if it was acceptable, engage the on-board automation to fly it.
Furthermore, routine tasks, such as transfer of control and
communication between sectors, were also entirely automated _ _ _ _ _
for equipped aircraft.
In contrast, the number of unequipped aircraft was varied
within each scenario, increasing linearly from around 5 to 20
aircraft, or until controller workload was subjectively assessed
as at or above maximum. A confederate ‘supervisor’ assigned
to each participant was asked to monitor controller workload
and restrict unequipped aircraft entry into the sector as needed.
This procedure was used during the simulation to establish a
maximum unequipped aircraft count and ‘turn away’ count for
each run.
1) Participants
Participants consisted of two certified professional air
traffic controllers from Los Angeles Center (ZLA), and two
operations supervisors from ZLA and Denver Center (ZDV).
Their air traffic control (ATC) experience spanned from 11 to
25 years with an average of 20 years of ATC experience. In
addition to the participants, there were four subject matter
expert (SME) observers who provided additional data and
feedback on operational feasibility.
Participants were divided into two groups of two and
assigned to the first or second week of the study. Each
controller participated in up to 12 data collection runs. Two
sectors with different traffic characteristics were selected for
the study, and controllers experienced each traffic condition in
The experiment consisted of four conditions, 	 each sector at least once. Nigher traffic conditions 3 and 4 were
incorporating a within-subjects design (Figure 1). The number	 repeated when possible. 	 Comment [AB 14I : SZ input
of equipped aircraft was varied across the conditions. In the	 2) Airspace	 Comment [AB13I : SZ: what does this
Baseline condition (0x), there were no equipped aircraft. In the	 The simulation airspace consisted of Sector 90 in Kansas 	 mean?
Conditions 1x, 2x, and 3x, the number of equipped aircraft was 	 City Center (ZKC) and Sector 91 in Indianapolis Center (ZID).
held relatively constant at 15, 30, and 45 aircraft, respectively, 	 The traffic in ZKC-90 consisted mostly of en route aircraft in
across the 45-minute scenario. These were approximately 1, 2, 	 level flight (approximately 90% of all flights). Traffic flows in
and 3 times the maximum traffic count that a single controller 	 ZID-91 were a mix of over flights, arrivals, and departures with
could manage in the test sectors under current day operations. approximately 80% in level flight. For a given simulation run,
each controller participant ran a single-sector problem,
managing the traffic in either ZKC-90 or ZID-91. Retired
controllers worked surrounding sectors to handle regular
controller duties such as handoffs and transfer of
communication (TOC) for all incoming and exiting traffic. All
of the simulated aircraft were flown by pseudo-pilots.
In contrast, unequipped aircraft had no data link
capability, and were managed by the air traffic controller
through radio voice communication.
The ground CD&R automation was responsible for
detecting conflicts between all on-trajectory aircraft (both
equipped and unequipped), and for resolving conflicts between
equipped aircraft without involving the controller. Controller
participants were responsible for resolving conflicts involving
unequipped aircraft, and monitoring separation of unequipped
off-trajectory aircraft. Controllers could access the conflict
resolution automation to request conflict free routes or altitudes
and issue these to the selected equipped or unequipped aircraft
by data link or voice.
A general hypothesis of the study was that mixed
equipage operations would be feasible with a low-to-moderate
number of unequipped aircraft. It was also hypothesized that
there would exist a certain critical airspace complexity
threshold that, if exceeded, would make mixed operations
infeasible. Conditions with a greater number of equipped
aircraft were hypothesized to increase the overall traffic
complexity and the number of mixed conflicts in the sector,
increasing controller workload, and reducing the number of
unequipped aircraft that could be safely managed. To
investigate this hypothesis, the experiment design varied two
traffic factors, the number of unequipped and the number of
equipped aircraft, to examine when mixed operations become
infeasible.
	Controllers accessed the new CD&R tools through fields in	 Comment [AB22] : SZ: ..new fields?
the data tag, including a trial plan portal, the altitude, and a _
	number that signified minutes-to-conflict whenever the CD&R	 - Comment [AB23] : SZ change
algorithm detected a conflict. Current day data tags were used
	
for unequipped aircraft, whereas equipped aircraft were	 Comment [AB24] : SZ change
depicted with low-lighted directional symbols and altitudes to
provide a general picture of traffic clusters.
- - Comment [AB17] : SZ input resides to
resided
- - Comment [AB18] : SZ addition J
Figure 2. Controller Display for Sector 90
3)	 Operational Concept, Assumptions, and Separation B.	 Controller Workstations
Responsibilities The controller’s display was modified to support the Comment [AB19] : sz - from what"
The concept was predicated on the assumption that the redefined roles and responsibilities described above. Because
centralized groundside automation could detect and resolve trajectory monitoring, transfer of control and communication,
conflicts involving properly equipped aircraft that were on 4D and conflict detection and resolution would be handled by the Comment [AB20] : SZ change
trajectories. The groundside automation was configured to automation for equipped aircraft, the controller did not need to
resolve conflicts between equipped aircraft without controller maintain	 detailed	 awareness	 of	 each	 individual	 flight.,
_
lComment [AB15] : SZ input
involvement by issuing FMS-loadable data link clearances, Therefore
	 the	 controller workstation	 was	 drastically	 re- Comment [AB21] : SZ change
thus maintaining common trajectory intent between air and designed.
ground. Given similar ADS-B-out and FMS equipage, the
ground	 side	 automation	 could	 also	 detect	 conflicts	 for The goal of this redesign was to provide the controllers
unequipped	 aircraft	 on	 known trajectories; 	 thus	 it	 was appropriate 	 and	 adequate	 awareness	 of the	 automation-
important for the controller to keep unequipped aircraft on 4D managed (equipped) aircraft while maintaining focus on the
trajectories whenever possible. This was a new responsibility unequipped aircraft that were their primary responsibility. Comment [AB16] : LT: Was the controller_
for controllers, and somewhat different from cur rent practice. - -Given the high levels of rra#'fic	 -concept  could support,- aware of the automated ground clearances sent
equipped aircraft were represented by a limited data block to the equipped? How? Were the 4DWhile data-link equipped aircraft were managed by the (which could be expanded on demand) to reduce display trajectories for the unequipped identical to the
automation, controllers managed unequipped aircraft using complexity. Figure 2 shows the prototype display with 3x equipped or was a time buffer added?
manually	 created	 or	 automation-generated	 resolution traffic (approximately 50 aircraft).
maneuvers. Lateral or vertical solutions could be developed
using advanced path planning tools. For a vertical path or
altitude change, the controller issued the clearance and
monitored the aircraft for safety and conformance during the
transition. For lateral route changes, ground tools provided the
controller with an initial heading, time-to-turn back, and the
waypoint that returned the aircraft to its original path. The
controller issued the initial heading change, monitored the
aircraft until it reached the turn back point, then cleared it
direct to the next waypoint. Because of the imprecision
inherent in timing the heading change and turn back
maneuvers, aircraft were likely to deviate somewhat from the
automation generated trajectory until they resumed lateral
navigation to the next waypoint.
Whenever unequipped aircraft were not on their
trajectories, controllers were responsible for keeping them
safely separated from other traffic. Controllers were also
expected to monitor unequipped transitioning aircraft due to
greater uncertainty in the trajectory predictions during climbs
and descents and the resulting degradation of automated
conflict detection performance. In order to enable controllers to
monitor aircraft during off-trajectory and transitioning states,
the data block or aircraft symbol needed to provide a clear,
unambiguous indication where separation responsibility
resided.
As an additional operator’s incentive, the concept assumed
that priority was given to data link equipped aircraft whenever
a mixed conflict occurred between equipped and unequipped
aircraft. In this situation the controller was responsible for
resolving the conflict and was instructed to move the
unequipped aircraft whenever possible. Assuming that the
aircraft in conflict were on their trajectories, a conflict between
equipped and unequipped or between two or more unequipped
aircraft was detected by the automation and solved by the
controller. Although priority was given to equipped aircraft
when possible, the automation could provide a resolution for
either aircraft, and controllers could move either aircraft at their 	 When conflicts between unequipped and equipped aircraft
discretion. occurred, the conflicts were highlighted in magenta. For both
mixed and unequipped only conflicts, the data tag color turned
from green to yellow when the time-to-conflict was between
two and five minutes, and then to red when the time-to-conflict
was less than two minutes. These changes in the data tag colors
for aircraft in conflict was intended to elevate the controller’s
situation awareness of these aircraft.
IV. RESULTS
A. Aircraft Count
The average number of unequipped and equipped aircraft
was recorded throughout each simulation run. Figure 3 shows
the average equipped and unequipped aircraft count over time
for sector 91. A visual comparison of Figures 1 and 3 shows
the actual number of aircraft in the study matching the original
design. The aircraft count for sector 90 showed similar
patterns.
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Figure 3. Average Aircraft Count, Sector 91 – number of unequipped (green)
and equipped (beige) aircraft observed during 0x, 1x, 2x, and 3x traffic
conditions
Controller workload was measured for both test sectors (90,
91) at different traffic levels (0x, 1x, 2x, 3x). The data was
analyzed using repeated measures Two-Way Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA). The level of equipped aircraft
significantly affected workload ratings (p <0.005), but there
were no significant effects on workload ratings between the
two test sectors (p >0.20) or the interaction effects of sector and
traffic level (p <0.20). A One-Way ANOVA was then
calculated to determine which of the traffic level conditions
(0x, 1x, 2x, 3x) significantly affected workload ratings. Of the
six possible combinations, 0x vs. 2x (p <0.05), 0x vs. 3x (p
<0.025), and 1x vs. 3x (p <0.005) were significant.
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As designed, the unequipped aircraft count ramped up
linearly over time, peaking at around 20 aircraft by the end of Figure 4. 	 Average Workload Ratings for Sector 90 in 5-minute intervals
the run. Due to controller manipulation and the dynamic nature The results support the over-the-shoulder observations and
of air traffic, no two runs were exactly alike. In sector 91, participant feedback that 0x and 1x conditions exhibit similar
unequipped aircraft count in the 3x condition was noticeably levels of traffic complexity. Both were “controllable” traffic
lower than the other traffic conditions in the final 15 minutes of with acceptable level of workload and no loss of separation. In
the scenario. The observed peaks in total traffic were: 90-0x = contrast, the 2x and 3x conditions exhibited higher traffic27, 90-1x = 39, 90-2x = 50, 90-3x = 64, 91-0x = 23, 91-1x = complexity due to increased overall traffic and a substantial39, 91-2x = 52, and 91-3x = 62. Equipped aircraft count was increase in mixed conflict frequencies, resulting in traffic that ebased on the number of aircraft in the physical sector. was “less controllable” with excessive workload and possible Comment	 [AB2 5] : SZ: Did controllers
Unequipped aircraft count was the number of aircraft inside the loss of separation. hand off any AC before they physically left
physical sector plus the number of aircraft that the controller sector? Are these included or excluded from
controlled outside the physical sector. This combination was C. 	 Number of Aircraft Turned Away count?
chosen because it closely represents the true load of aircraft the
controllers managed. Total aircraft turned is the number of unequipped aircraft Comment [AB26] : LT: Don’t understand
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - “turned away” when the participant sector load approached this. If all equipped A/C were inside the sector,
B. 	 Controller Workload maximum. Confederate supervisors were assigned to ea ch how did the outsiders contribute to conflict-
Workload ratings were obtained during data collection runs
participant to monitor his/her workload and to limit aircraft
entering the sector as needed. The number of aircraft turned
related workload?
by prompting controllers every five minutes to assess their away indicated when subjective controller workload reached its
instantaneous workload on a scale of 1 (very low) to 7 (very peak.
high), and then click on the corresponding button on the
display. Figure 4 shows the average workload ratings for sector First, a Two-Way ANOVA was computed to test for
90 over time. Subjective workload increased over time as significance. Again, sector (90, 91) and traffic level (0x, 1x, 2x,
aircraft count increased. Unlike the more linear increase in 3x) were the independent variables. Traffic level significantly
aircraft count, however, workload ratings show a slight affected the total number of aircraft turned (p <0.001), whereas
inflection about 30 minutes into the scenario, followed by a the sector (p >0.20) and sector and traffic level interaction (p
rapid increase until the sector became “unworkable.” For sector >0.20) did not.
91, which had more transitioning aircraft, a similar but more Second, One-Way ANOVAs were used to test traffic levellinear trend was observed. Workload for sector 91 was rated
and total aircraft turned significance. Significance was found in Comment [AB27] : SZ change from	 ehigher earlier in the scenario, presumably due to higher traffic four of six conditions: 0x vs. 2x (p <0.025), 0x vs. 3x (p "controllable" "just for consistency"...
complexity, and it too became “unworkable” in the final third
-- - - - - - -
of the run. -<0.025y,1x vs-.2(p <0.05), 1x vs. 3x (p <0025). Similar to-' •_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _	 _ _ workload ratings 	 the results support a general grouping of--' umComment [AB28] : Lacceptbtootendency of controller to accept	 many
too
I unequipped?
0x/1x vs. 2x/3x traffic levels in terms of overall difficulty in
controlling the traffic.
Figure 5 shows the average number of aircraft turned away
per traffic level condition for sectors 90 and 91. In the 0x
condition, no aircraft were turned, suggesting that the peak
unequipped aircraft count was challenging but manageable. In
the 1x condition, the results were skewed by an anomaly of one
participant turning away eleven aircraft, which accounted for
all aircraft turned in sector 90.
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Figure 6. Time until First Aircraft Turned Away during 45-minute
Simulation Run
D. Traffic Complexity Metrics
The relationship between subjective workload ratings and
objective complexity metrics was examined using the step-wise
multiple linear regression method. Fifty-three traffic
complexity metrics (sometimes called “dynamic density”
metrics) have been gathered from literature and their
importance has been examined in prior studies by Kopardekar
and Magyarits (Koardekar and Magyarits, 2003) [8]. For this
_ - - Comment [AB29] : LT add
Figure 5.	 Average Number Aircraft Turned Away for Sector 90 (blue) and study, 53 complexity variables were analyzed separately for
Sector 91 (green) equipped, unequipped, and total aircraft.
All participants contributed to the average in the 2x and 3x
traffic level conditions. At the 2x traffic level, several aircraft The regression of the full complexity variable set resulted
were turned for each sector, though sector 90 had two more in coefficient of variation (R2 = 0.864, R = 0.746). In order to
aircraft turned on average. Sector 91 was believed to be more reduce the number of correlated variables, only variables with a
difficult during higher levels of traffic, due to transitioning variance inflation factor of 10 or less were identified. The
-
-	
^
_	 Comment [AB30]
	
SZ change:
aircraft. This is supported by an average of 9.75 aircraft turned followin	 complex 	 variables were found to be si lticg	 P	 fY	 !	 ant
during the 3x condition. based on that criterion:
An examination of when the controller turned the first • 	 Horizontal proximity of all aircraft
aircraft shows a similar pattern of results. The traffic level • 	 Number of unequipped aircraft
significantly affected when the first aircraft was turned (p • 	 Horizontal proximity of unequipped aircraft
<0.001). The sector and traffic level interaction were not • 	 Aircraft density of unequipped aircraft
significant.
• 	 Separation criticality index of unequipped aircraft
In Figure 6, 0x had no aircraft turned, hence all 45 minutes • 	 Percentage of unequipped aircraft that are either
passed with no first turn. The 1x condition had aircraft turned climbing or descending
relatively late in the scenario (minute 42), suggesting the • 	 Number of aircraft predicted to be in a mixed
controllers were not overworked until a few minutes before that equipage conflict
time.	 As the	 complexity increased over the	 conditions, • 	 Aircraft density of equipped aircraft
controllers turned aircraft much sooner (some as early as 22
minutes in the 3x condition). Sector 91’s average first turn was It is interesting to note that the horizontal proximity of all28 minutes compared to sector 90’s 35 minutes. This supports aircraft and the unequipped aircraft count were significant
the overall results that sector 91 was more difficult to control variables. A possible reason is that the higher the horizontaldue to greater traffic complexity. proximity of the aircraft, the closer they are to each other, Comment [AB 31] : SZ deletion
reducing the options available to resolve a conflict. The
reduced number of resolution options resulted in increased
complexity for controllers. The number of unequipped aircraft Comment [AB32] : SZ deletion
and their density (number of aircraft divided by the volume
they occupy) were also related to their proximity and their Comment	 [AB 33] : SZ correction
impact on reducing the number of available options in conflict
resolution. The equipped aircraft density also reduced the
available options for unequipped aircraft, particularly for
conflict resolution, which resulted in increased complexity.
The separation iticali index refers to how close the
	
_eP	 cr _ t}'	 _____________	 Comment [AB34]: SZ correction
aircraft are with respect to their separation minima. This index
often correlates with traffic density because higher density in
the same airspace results in closer proximity between aircraft.
The percentage of climbing and descending unequipped
aircraft increased complexity for controllers because climb and
descend profiles involve uncertainties and must be monitored
closely. Aircraft predicted to be in mixed equipage conflicts
also added to complexity. The controller was instructed to give
priority to equipped aircraft, moving unequipped aircraft using
voice clearances. At their discretion however, (e.g., due to
traffic and/or time constraints), controllers could choose to
move the equipped aircraft via data link. In either case,
resolving mixed conflicts involved added complexity.
	
Sector 90	 Sector 91
Mixed Unequipped Mixed Unequipped
Scenario conflict 	 conflict	 conflict	 conflict
0x	 0	 11	 0	 7
1x	 14	 10	 14	 7
2x	 22	 11	 26	 7
3x	 31	 10	 45	 7
Although sector 91 has a lower number of unequipped
conflicts than sector 90, the ratio between mixed and
unequipped conflicts is larger and grows more quickly with
traffic levels – the final ratio between the two types of conflicts
being nearly 7:1-as opposed to 3:1 in sector 90. The rapid
growth of mixed conflicts in sector 91 is likely due to sector
geometry, more complex route structures, and higher numbers
of transitioning aircraft, resulting in greater traffic complexity.
Conflict resolution strategies in the mixed operations were
also examined. This analysis included the type of maneuver
that was used for the resolution (lateral or vertical) as well as
which type of aircraft was selected as the maneuvering aircraft
in conflicts involving an equipped and unequipped aircraft pair.
Of the types of maneuvers participants used for resolving
conflicts, there was a strong preference for using altitude rather
than lateral maneuvers. However, a noticeable trend emerged
where lateral maneuvers at 0x traffic level were limited to 7%
of the overall number of resolutions, compared to 3x, where
lateral maneuvers made up 27% of the maneuvers. Increased
use of lateral maneuvers in higher traffic levels was likely due
to the fact that with greater numbers of aircraft occupying the
sector, fewer conflict-free altitude maneuvers were available to
the participant, especially in sector 91, which had a significant
portion of the airspace occupied by transitioning aircraft.
all conflicts and followed its built-in preference to maneuver
the unequipped aircraft whenever possible. For sector 90, the
percentages were 7% of equipped aircraft maneuvered at 2x
and 19% at 3x. Sector 91 showed a similar trend with equipped
aircraft maneuvered in 2% of the conflicts at 2x and 5% of the
conflicts at 3x.
F. Separation Violations
These numbers are relatively low, given the high traffic
density and workload. As expected, the number of separation
violations increases for the 3x condition, suggesting that a
substantial increase in safety risk occurs between 2x and 3x
traffic.
G. Participant Feedback
In the post-simulation questionnaire, participants and
confederate supervisors were asked how many unequipped
aircraft they felt could be safely managed in sectors 90 and 91
for each condition. Average responses for sector 90, were 17,
16, 13, and 10 aircraft in the 0x, 1x, 2x, and 3x traffic
conditions, respectively, and 17, 15, 11, and 9 aircraft for
sector 91. Comparing these aircraft counts to the subjective
workload data recorded during the simulation found them
corresponding to a workload rating of between 2 and 3 (on a 1
– 7 scale) for each condition.
Although controllers were asked to solve the mixed
conflicts by moving the unequipped aircraft, they were given
the authority and the tools to move the equipped aircraft if the
traffic situation warranted it. Data on usage of the auto-
resolution function was analyzed to examine whether theAs predicted, the greatest contributing factors to controller
workload related to unequipped aircraft. The equipped aircraft 	 equipped or unequipped aircraft were maneuvered to resolve
contributed to the overall workload b the sheer increase in 	 mixed conflicts. However, during 1x runs, controllers
- - - - - - - - - -
reat
- -
r 
-p - 
y 
- -
ty	 - - frequently resolved conflicts based on their own strategi 	
Comment [AB35I : SZ changees and-- - -traffic density, resulting in geroximi between aircraft
	 used the auto-resolution function primarily to solve conflicts
and higher frequency of mixed equipage conflicts, reducing the 	 that were more difficult to resolve. In these difficult situations,
number of maneuver options.	 they maneuvered the equipped aircraft about one third of the
time (31% in sector 90 and 43% in sector 91). In 2x and 3x
E. Conflict Analyses	 runs controllers used the auto-resolution function frequently for
Table 1 presents a side-by-side comparison of each test
sector’s distribution of the average number of conflicts
according to the equipage mix of the conflict pairs. The number
of conflicts between unequipped aircraft remains relatively
constant across conditions because the traffic count and
patterns of unequipped aircraft does not vary significantly
between experimental conditions. In contrast, the number of
mixed equipage conflicts increase along with traffic levels.
Table 1. Distribution of average number of conflicts per test sector
according to equipage of conflict pair
	Separation vi l tions w r  eported when aircraft came 	 Comment [AB37I : SZ comment: “This
	within a dist nce of 5 m laterally and 1000 ft vertically, and at 	 makes me wonder were there any
	least one of the aircraft was unequipped. At the 0x level of 	 equipped/equipped violations?”
traffic, no mixed or unequipped separation violations occurred
in either sector. In the 1x condition, sector 90 experienced a
mean number of 0.75 violations, with none recorded in sector
91. Both sectors experienced violations in the 2x condition,
with more in sector 90 (M=0.75) than sector 91 (M=0.25). A
violation increase in both sectors was again observed at 3x,
with sector 91 reporting a mean of 2.0 and sector 90 a mean of
1.0 violations.
where the percentage of lateral resolution maneuvers increased
with increased traffic. This is most noticeable in sector 91 	 Comment [AB36I : SZ deletion
separation. In order to maneuver unequipped aircraft,
procedures need to be in place to allow for a closed trajectory
solution to be transmitted to the aircraft and entered into the
ground system. The process of issuing a heading and a turn
back in two separate steps is inappropriate for maneuvering
multiple unequipped aircraft at high traffic densities. 	 Comment [AB40] : SZ comment
During the debriefing discussions, participants expressed a
different criterion for safe management. If they were
responsible for monitoring separation when the aircraft were
free track, climbing or descending, they suggested that they
could safely manage a maximum of three aircraft in these
states.
Participants, observers, and confederate supervisors were
asked whether the traffic density of the equipped aircraft
significantly affected the workload. They responded that
workload was increased, because 1) there were more
transitioning aircraft, which increased complexity; 2) there
were more mixed conflicts; and 3) there were fewer resolution
options. They also commented that as the traffic density of the
equipped aircraft increased, the participants resorted to more
automated conflict resolutions due to fewer resolution options
and not enough time to manually search for the optimum
resolution.
Questions about mixed operations acceptability addressed
how acceptable it was to 1) rely on the automation for conflict
detection and resolution, 2) have aircraft in one’s sector but not
under one’s control, and 3) manage unequipped aircraft in the
mixed environment. Responses resulted in average ratings of 5
and above (1 = completely unacceptable; 7 = completely
acceptable) for all questions.
Questions related to difficulty monitoring aircraft in
different states in a mixed airspace environment suggested
changes to decision support tools that would improve situation
awareness. Better display information for separation status of
off-trajectory aircraft, and an ability to monitor the turn back
point in the voice-initiated lateral route change could lessen the
overall monitoring workload and increase safety.
V. DISCUSSION
The 0x condition showed that simply adding advanced
ground automation (including CD&R) to an otherwise
unchanged air traffic control environment does not provide
major capacity benefits. In line with previous research,
controllers may be able to handle a few more aircraft per
sector, but the basic workload of conducting routine tasks and
clearance based operations limits the scalability of the traffic to
little more than the current day monitor alert parameters.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, this study indicates that static and strict airspace
segregation is not needed and could unnecessarily limit	 Comment [AB41] : SZ question: limit
capacity. In the author’s opinion, airspace can be integrated and 	 capacity or limit airspace access?
unequipped aircraft can get access as long as an examination of
the primary complexity factors does not exceed certain
thresholds. Primary factors would have to include the number
of unequipped aircraft already in the airspace, the overall traffic
density and the number of current and expected off-trajectory
operations. As more aircraft become equipped, fewer aircraft
would likely get access to the integrated airspace. The results
indicate that it is feasible for a controller, with the help from
automation for conflict detection and resolution, to manage
unequipped aircraft within the same airspace as equipped
aircraft. Therefore, the study results suggest that the integrated
airspace operations are feasible, to a limit, with support from
automation for conflict detection and resolution. This finding
has clear implications on the airspace configuration as a result
of equipage and density.
The results of this study give relevant insights into the The main results of this study indicate that the mixedfeasibility of air traffic controllers managing unequipped
equipage operations are feasible, to a limit, within the same
aircraft within the same airspace in which equipped aircraft are
airspace. The higher the traffic density of equipped aircraft, the
managed by ground automation. Complimentary research is lower the number of unequipped aircraft that can be manag 	 - -ed- mment-	 Co	 [AB38] : SZ changebeing	 conducted to	 investigate the	 appropriate level	 of
automation for safely managing equipped aircraft (Prevot et al., within the same airspace. This is logical, becaus hi 	 er traffic-	 _	 - -	 Comment [1B42] : SZ correction
2008) [9]. density in the same volume reduces the degrees of freedom or
s
maneuver	 options	 for	 conflict	 resolution.	 Under	 such
Controller workload depends on various complexity factors. conditions,	 the	 controller	 workload	 also	 increases.	 The
Higher traffic density of equipped aircraft has a generally small statistically significant complexity factors also suggest aircraft
and predictable impact on controller workload, whereas factors density of equipped and unequipped aircraft impact the
related to the unequipped aircraft have a much more significant complexity. Interestingly, the controllers accepted all aircraft
impact. For example 45	 equipped aircraft managed by under all unequipped aircraft traffic condition with current
automation may still allow a controller to safely handle twelve level of traffic. Under mixed equipage traffic conditions, the
unequipped aircraft as long as they are on their trajectories and higher the density of traffic, the earlier the controllers stopped
the automation provides reliable conflict detection support. accepting the unequipped aircraft in the sector. The simulation
However, if three of these twelve aircraft are on vectors or showed that mixed equipage operations are feasible in the same Comment [AB43 ] : SZ change
transitioning, the situation may become uncontrollable and too airspace, even under higher traffic density conditions such as
mPco plex _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3x. However, there is a limit_ to which the controllers can	 - -	 Comment [AB39] : SZ changes
Therefore, the main complexity factors need to be properly manage the mixed equipage. 	 In summary, it appears thatintegrated
managed when allowing unequipped aircraft to enter integrated airspace operations are feasible tc  a limit. The trafficdensity, 
a
automation levels for conflict detection and resolution,
airspace that includes a high number of equipped aircraft. All and equipage will be key factors in the design and adjustments
aircraft should always be kept on trajectories to retain conflict of the airspace configuration.detection integrity. When 1x traffic density is clearly exceeded,
controllers can no longer monitor aircraft for potential losses of
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